Mary Gail Dufresne
Graduate Student

Ricky Telg
Assistant Professor
University of Florida

Background

INTRODUCTION
In 1997 and 1998, Florida's agricultural community was forced to focus time and resources communicating to the general public about the Mediterranean fruit fly (Medfly) and the control methods used to eradicate the pest when the fly threatened the state's $6.8 million agriculture industry. Activist groups were able to get the attention of the mass media as the groups challenged the use of the insecticide malathion, asserting that the chemical poses health and environmental risks. Local and state media picked up the story of both the Medfly infestation and subsequent protests, often leading to "front page" stories. The activists also began pressuring governmental agencies to revoke the temporary permit allowing the use of aerial malathion bait spray, the most efficient and effective means of eradicating the destructive fly. Agricultural communicators representing both private industry and the governmental agencies, who were legally charged with the re sponsibility of eradicating the pest, defended the use of malathion as part of an overall Medfly eradication plan designed to protect the economic contributions made by agriculture as well as the landscapes and gardens of Floridians. They were forced to engage in public relations in order to manage the attention placed on both the eradication and the industry.


The Infestations
In late May 1997, a Mediterranean fruit fly was found in a trap in Hillsborough County. Aerial spraying of malathion began June 5 over the town of Brandon; at that time, state agriculture officials assured the public about the safety of malathion. "Malathion is just about the safest of all pesticides being used," said Dr. Mary Jo Hayes, a biologist with the state Agricultural Department's Division of Plant Industry (Attack on Medfly Set to Begin, 1997). By mid-June, the spray area had expanded to 300 square miles and Commissioner of Agriculture Bob Crawford publicly declared an "all-out assault" on the Medfly as a Medfly was detected in Lakeland, Florida, the heart of Florida's citrus production area. By early August, the citrus industry began to worry that the quarantine would negatively impact early citrus crops, especially since the mandatory fumigation associated with the quarantine could cost several hundred dollars per truckload of fruit (Sloan, 1997).

During the infestation, the United States Environmental Protection Agency became involved to declare spray buffer zones around bodies of water and to require 24 hours of notice to residents before spraying could begin. The University of South Florida and the Hillsborough County Health Department began a study to look for people who felt they were suffering ill effects from the spraying.

On September 21, administrative law Judge Mary Clark declared that the emergency rule under which the eradication plan had been operating since May was invalid for further spraying. CRAM (Citizens for Responsible Application of Malathion), a Hillsborough County-based activist group, had challenged the rule based on provisions that allow an emergency rule to last for no longer than 90 days; under state law, emergency rules are not renewable (Judge Rules Against Medfly Spraying, 1997). The 1998 infestation ended with 748 flies having been trapped in five different counties and 82 different crops quarantined in areas where Medflies were found.

Little attention, other than that placed on the controversy surrounding malathion, was in the news until the 1998 infestation began with the discovery of a Medfly in a Dade County on April 1; ground application of malathion began almost immediately. The 1998 infestation also flared up in Lake County's and in Manatee County. Although the eradication program was initially limited to ground application of malathion, the EPA approved a request to aerially apply malathion over areas in Manatee County.

< BR>Communication and Controversy
The community activist group CRAM formed in Hillsborough County on June 5, 1997 in response to eradication plans. Although membership was initially small, it swelled to hundreds in just two weeks (Another Medfly found..., 1997). Members of CRAM were vocal opponents of malathion, particularly when sprayed aerially. The World Wide Web page for the group stated that the group believes that "the State of Florida is trying to save the citrus industry at the expense of the land and our lives" (CRAM, 1998). They encouraged citizens to join their group because "every single person who helps will aid us in stopping this wholesale poisoning of the people, the animals, and the land for the sake of the orange juice and petroleum industries" (CRAM, 1998) the group began collecting signatures on petitions of protest against the eradication program, and eventually succeeded in getting an administrative judge to invalidate the emerge ncy rule that allowed the malathion application.

Although less mentioned in the newspapers in 1997, SCRAM (Sarasota/Manatee Citizens Rally Against Malathion) was more successful in preventing aerial application of malathion. SCRAM managed to raise enough opposition to aerial malathion spraying that state officials agreed to only apply malathion to the ground 200 meters around the finds (Sarasota says SCRAM and Fly Sprayers Back Off, 1997). SCRAM paid to fly in "experts" from California to discuss health and environmental issues related to the eradication program. One of these experts was a California State University biologist who told the U.S. House of Representatives that Florida's Medfly that eradication plan was "scientifically corrupt" (Sarasota says SCRAM and Fly Sprayers back Off, 1997).

During the summer of 1998, newspaper articles featuring complaints about malathion use began regularly appearing in newspapers. In particular, ther e were complaints from people with chemical sensitivities, parents, organic farmers, beekeepers, and tropical fish farmers. As spraying reached Tampa Bay's most populated areas, the hotline established for public questions and comments was receiving up to 1,000 calls each day (State Expands Spraying Area As Aerial War Reaches Downtown Tampa, 1997) though none of the calls resulted in a confirmed case of malathion poisoning. A project at USF began tracking reported health problems, and state health officials asserted that state agriculture officials had not notified them before the eradication program began. (Attention Turns to Spraying's Effects, 1997).

Toward the end of the 1997 infestation, several newspaper articles were highly critical of malathion use and provided an opportunity for those who believed that their health had been impacted by malathion to air their complaints. Several in The Tampa Tribune, the main paper serving the Tampa area, asserted that malathi on caused health problems in children exposed to yards and pools that had been exposed to malathion.

The 1998 infestation was by far more widespread and involved more than twice the number of flies than were found in 1997. It was also different in that Lake County is a rural area whereas those involved in the 1997 infestation were urban and suburban areas. Very little public comment was been made about the eradication efforts in Lake County, but residents of Manatee and Sarasota counties were not so quiet.

When it was announced that aerial application would take place in Manatee County, residents "screamed and hissed" at a panel of state agriculture and health officials (Kamins, 1998). SCRAM, teaming up with a group called Floridians Against Chemical Trespass (FACT), unsuccessfully attempted to take legal action to stop the spraying. Matthew McMilliam, an attorney for both CRAM and SCRAM wrote Marcia Mulkey of the EPA's Office of Pesticides a lette r that stated in an April 20 letter that "my clients cannot think of anything which would allow them to accept the continued use of malathion." In the letter, he also stated that discontinued use of malathion for Medfly control would not have any negative impact on agriculture. A flier was distributed by an organization identifying itself as "Kids Who Care" that described malathion as "a nerve gas" and listed symptoms of toxicity that are not consistent with those listed in medical or scientific literature for malathion (Fuller, 1998).


Public Relations Models
Grunig's four models of public relations (1992) are useful tools for describing the type and quality of the Florida agricultural communicators' public relations efforts. His press agentry/publicity model describes one-sided communication geared toward manipulation of the message and audience. The second model is the public information model and was developed by corporations in response to accusations made by muckrakers. It generates one-sided communications that are slanted in favor of the organization but are also truthful and accurate. His third model is the two-way, asymmetrical model in which an organization gets input from its publics in the form of research, but that input is used for the purpose of convincing and persuading those same publics.

The two-way, symmetrical model was the fourth model, which Grunig believed would lead to excellence in public relations. In this model, organizations use various means of research and communication to better understand their publics and use that information to facilitate understanding and communication, (Grunig & Grunig, 1992) rather than to motivate or persuade. In the symmetrical model, understanding is the main goal (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Given that the Florida agricultural community is such a diverse group, it is possible that all four models of communication were practiced at some p oint and time.

The Medfly infestations also required the agricultural communicators to practice issues management in regards to the core concerns raised by the public and media in regards to eradicating the Medfly. In their discussion of issues management, Heath and Cousino (1990) developed four issues management functions that are needed in order for a company to achieve maximum profit, operate without conflict from the public policy environment, and foster positive relationships with publics: 1) involvement of public policy experts in strategic business planning and management, 2) issue communication, 3) issue monitoring and analysis, and 4) efforts to meet changing standards of corporate social responsibility. Although it may be the product of activism, Gaunt and Ollenburger (1995) point out that issues management is a proactive strategy that tries to identify issues and influence decisions regarding them before they can cause problems. In the case of the agricult ure community and the Medfly, issues management would most likely take the form of managing environmental and public health-related issues before an infestation put them in the spotlight.

In order for agricultural communicators to practice effective crisis communication, a program of proactive public relations is necessary (Guth, 1995). Guth observes that an inappropriate response to a crisis can pose tangible loss, such as damage to property or lost revenue and intangible losses such as a loss of public confidence in an organization. This is an especially important point for Florida agriculture to consider.

Much of the agricultural communicators' public relations efforts also fell into the category of risk communication, which is communication specifically designed to convey messages about risks and the potential benefits from those risks. Public relations practitioner William Adams (1992-93) made the following observations about how the media react to risk communication: 1) the news media will generally ignore your organization's experts in favor of government or activist sources, 2) journalists often lack a knowledge of the environmental and/or scientific facts surrounding a particular risk, 3) there is a tendency for journalists to personalize a risk-related story. Adams asserted that if a practitioner is able to anticipate how and why journalists react to risk issues, it may be possible to "anticipate and/or mitigate damage caused by inaccurate or incompetent reporting" (1992-93, pp.29-30).


Significance
This case study is significant for three reasons: timeliness, economic impact, and lack of case studies that focus on agriculture, specifically Florida agriculture. First, this study is timely. The 1997 Medfly infestation was the largest since 1956; the 1998 infestation was even larger. With the infestations still fresh on the minds of the agricultural community, this study was able to get an inside look at how communication was carried out, how messages were sent and interpreted, and how important communication decisions were made. In addition, this study is timely because of the growing pressure on the agriculture industry regarding the use of pest control chemicals. As the general public becomes more intolerant of chemicals used in the production of food and fiber, the agricultural community must be prepared to effectively communicate its position on such matters.

Second, this study is significant because of the economic impact of agriculture on Florida's economy and the cost of eradication efforts. Agriculture brings almost $7 billion into the state every year. The Medfly attacks over 250 different fruits, vegetables, and nuts, many of which are economically important to Florida agriculture. Florida citrus, a particular favorite of the Medfly is a $3.6-billion-a-year industry that provides 75 percent of the citrus in the United States.

Finally, th is study is significant because there is a lack of case studies about agricultural communication problems. The agriculture industry faces problems that no other industry faces and must communicate about a staggering number of complicated issues; yet there remains a lack of documented cases from which industry professionals and students can learn.


Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to provide an in-depth look at the Florida agricultural community's communication efforts relating to 1997 and 1998 infestations of the Mediterranean fruit fly. The communications will be examined from a public relations perspective and recommendations will be made for improving the agricultural communicators' public relations efforts.

This research was designed to answer the following specific questions:
· From a public relations perspective, what messages were the agricultural communicators in Florida trying to communicate to the public and wh y were these particular messages chosen?
· How did communicators from different agricultural organizations coordinate their messages and cooperate during the infestations?
· What media did the agricultural communicators use to convey their messages?
· What messages did the communicators perceive to have been sent to the public via the mass media?
· Did the agricultural communicators gain and document knowledge that can be used should a similar situation occur in the future?

Method

This qualitative study was conducted using a descriptive case study technique in which a detailed account of the selected phenomenon -- the agricultural community's communication efforts regarding the two most recent infestations of the Mediterranean fruit fly -- is presented.

A primary advantage of the case study methodology is that it allowed the researcher to obtain a wealth of information and provide detail about this research topic (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987). Merriam (1998) observed that a case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and that "the primary interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than specific variables, in discovery rather than confirmation" (p.19). This methodology was also chosen since good situations for case studies are those that address an instance of some concern, issue or hypothesis and those that are intrinsically interesting. The Medfly communications are of great inter est to the Florida agricultural community and are likely intrinsically interesting to those who are involved in the public relations profession.

Wimmer and Dominick (1987) discussed the three main criticisms of the case study approach. The first relates to a lack of scientific rigor in many case studies. In his influential 1984 book Case Study Research, Yin asserts that truly rigorous case studies require a great deal of time and effort. The second criticism is that case studies are not easily generalized and should not be used when the goal of the study is to make statistical statements about the frequency of an occurrence (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987). Fortunately, the purpose of this particular study is to describe what occurred during a specific occurrence. The final criticism is simply that case studies are time consuming and can produce such large quantities of data that they are difficult to summarize and interpret. Also, since the researcher is the primary instrum ent of data collection, there is also always the risk of the researcher's personal biases or perspectives being projected, intentionally or not, into the study.

The data gathering method was face-to-face interviews conducted by the researcher during the fall of 1998. Eight interviews were conducted with members of the agricultural community who actively participated in the communication regarding the 1997 and 1998 Medfly infestations. The communicators included in the interview process were representatives of industry associations, Extension personnel from the University of Florida, USDA personnel, and a representative from the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (DACS).

A list of interview questions was developed and was refined under the advisement of a number of instructors and public relations professionals including faculty members in the Department of Agricultural Education and Communication and in the College of Journalism and Comm unications. Once a set of acceptable questions was been developed, two "test interviews" were scheduled with members of the Florida Agriculture Institute, an organization of agricultural communications professionals. After the test interviews were completed, the questions were revised as necessary. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed.
In addition to the primary data gathered, secondary sources of information were reviewed and used to develop the interview questions, as well as to fill in the details of the events that occurred during the 1997 and 1998 Medfly infestations. The researcher conducted an informal content review (not content analysis) of newspaper coverage related to the Medfly infestations, as well as reviewed memos, letters, e-mail, and trade publication. The purpose of this was to become as familiar as possible with what was presented in the mass media as well as to be able to understand and respond to any comments made about mas s media coverage by those interviewed. In reporting the findings, the individuals interviewed were randomly assigned pseudonyms so that their comments could be referenced without revealing their identities.

Results

1) The Medfly infestation and resulting media coverage, particularly the coverage published in The Tampa Tribune, did indeed have significant impacts on the organizations affected.

Andrew, an agricultural communicator, described the media's impact on the public's perception of the problem in the following way:
"They were able to strongly convince the public that malathion was going to kill them, that malathion was going to cause damage to their children, that they were going to have deformed babies in five year, that it was going to get in the water supply and that everyone was going to be drinking malathion."

Many of the communicators said they believed the media reports with the most negative impact were written by Jan Hollingsworth, an environmental reporter for The Tampa Tribune. All of the agricultural communicators said Hollingsworth's aversion to chemical control methods was reflected in her writing and had a significant impact on how th e general public - particularly those in urban areas of Tampa - perceived the chemical control program. As Catherine said:
"If you've read a lot of Jan Hollingsworth, you know she was a major factor in the problem. The fact that you had a reporter who wanted to spend so much time and clearly showed a bias in her presentation of the story had a huge impact on the public's perception and the political perception of the issue."

In fact, all of the communicators cited The Tampa Tribune's coverage of the issue as a major factor in the communications crisis that surrounded the 1997 Medfly infestation. Mary Ann, a public relations practitioner for the agriculture industry, described the paper's coverage the way:
"In Tampa, the public saw in the Tribune - other media actually handled the issue pretty fairly - they saw headlines that said 'Chemical Warfare.' They had a picture of the lone helicopter that they were using at that point in the program, th is big photograph on 1A. It was incredible. That's what the public saw during the first few weeks of the program, and that momentum continued."

The agriculture industry's communicators also said they felt that the groups organized against the use of malathion were able to manipulate the media in a way so the impacts were greater. Mary Ann went on to say,
"Their [the activists'] message was simple, and they were loud, and they were very savvy with the media. They did the protests, and they had the hand literature, and they did the petition. They held up the petitions along the wall of the county commission meeting in Tampa so the TV cameras would get them on screen looking like the victims. They were doing street theater, holding rallies, they were very visual, and they would put their people out there holding petitions that were taped together that would run 30 feet long. They knew how to manipulate television, and they had some very willing participants in the newspapers. I would say that CRAM and, to some extent SCRAM down in Sarasota, had a huge impact on the public's perception of the issue."


2) The activist groups were able to "strike first" and control the media message for a period of time that was damaging to the agricultural industry.

Most of the communicators indicated that activists groups were able to grab the attention of the media and promote their messages, unanswered by the ag community. As ag communicator Andrew aptly put it, " We were unprepared, and they had their facts together and their people speaking before we even realized what was going on." Another communicator, Alex, said "In 1998, we were late in understanding the level of public concern in the Tampa area - probably five weeks late (^Å.) Our antennae were not properly attuned, for one reason or another, and we were not focused early enough on the PR needs of that program."

A few of the communicators felt that they may have initially underestimated the potential for a public relations crisis because the activists groups were relatively small. Several of the communicators expressed their belief that the activists groups were not very large, but that their level of organization allowed them to get out in front of the issue and control the messages. Alex said:
"In proportion to their numbers, I think they had an incredible impact. Early on, they gained credibility with the media as the spokesman for the opposition. Every time the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (DACS) would make a statement, CRAM was recognized for the other side. They established credibility early on. They got a lot of ink. I think it was out of proportion to their numbers."

Several of the communicators also expressed that one reason their organizations' efforts were not immediately directe d toward public relations for the Medfly eradication was because they were busy with the complex process of planning and implementing the eradication program itself.


3) Although the Medfly eradication program and the associated industry received negative press, the mass media also delivered some important, positive messages to the public for the agriculture community.

All of the communicators agreed that although the media, especially The Tampa Tribune during 1997, carried many messages that were negative toward the eradication program, they also carried messages that were very important for the agriculture industry to get to the general public. Both the broadcast and print media discussed the potential financial impact to the state's economy if the eradication was unsuccessful, gave information about safety precautions to be taken during the malathion applications and disseminated the spray schedules when available. Catherine said:
"To the new spapers' credit, many covered every angle they possibly could without doing a commercial for the industry. They covered the economic impact of how the Medfly would impact growers and those employed by growers. They covered health risks and water supply issues. They talked a lot about logistics of spraying schedules and tactics and techniques used to distribute the malathion."

Ag communicator Mary Ann said:
"Other papers such as [The Lakeland] Ledger, the St. Petersburgh Times and the [Orlando] Sentinel were much more balanced in their approach. Though they covered the spraying side of it and raised questions about the spray, their coverage was still more balanced. They explained the bait spray better. We just didn't have the alarmism in the headlines or in the stories that we saw in The Tampa Tribune. They made more of an effort to get agriculture's side of it."


4) None of the communicators' organizations had a plan to specifically a ddress communication needs related to a Medfly infestation; general crisis communication plans were also absent from most of the organizations.

Only one of the communicators belonged to organizations that had what could be considered a formal crisis communication plan in place. A few of the communicators had what they considered to be communications plans, but those generally consisted of phone lists and the names of important contacts. Half of the communicators said they believed that plans were difficult to develop because "each crisis is different." Others said that they "just knew what to do when situations like this come up."

The sole organization that has a communications plan developed it after a 1990 Medfly infestation. Nicole said:
"The last major eradication program was in 1990 in Miami. That was the first time there was any opposition of any type. Of course, that was still very minor. And after that, we came up with a formal program for this. In fact, we trained 16 people to take homeowner calls."


5) The individual organizations within the agricultural community were able to communicate messages that were consistent with one another.

The individual communicators sent messages to the public via the mass media that were clear and consistent with one another. Among the most important of these messages were the economic importance of agriculture to the state's economy, the importance of agriculture to the local economy, the agricultural community's support for the eradication program, the potential for destruction should the pest go uncontrolled and the proven efficacy and safety of the products being used in eradication.

6) The major factor that contributed to the consistency in messages and coordination of communication was the communicators' participation in the Agriculture Institute of Florida.

The Agriculture Institute of Florida is an associ ation of communications professionals actively involved in the agriculture industry. Five of the communicators interviewed were members of its board of directors at the time of the interview, and the remaining three belong to organizations that are represented on the board. The relationships established through participation in this professional organization formed a crucial foundation that enabled the communicators to network their communication efforts. In regards to the impact of the Agriculture Institute, Catherine said:
"It was nice to know that suddenly, when the Department of Ag called and asked, 'What are we going to do?' all you had to do was run down the list of the board of directors and you knew who the 'A List' was. When you have a bunch of people on a list who know how to handle something like this and understand what needs to be done, that's half of your crisis plan right there. It worked quite well because we knew each other already - knew each other' s strengths and weaknesses. We understood the capacity for communication and regional restrictions, where offices were located, who was a good writer, who was a good schmoozer, who had computer savvy to make sure the data got transmitted, who had connections in Tallahassee. All of that stuff got taken care of in two and a half hours on a Friday because we had everyone we needed."


7) The communicators used a variety of media to get their messages disseminated. Personal relationships and personal contact were essential in communicating with the public and quieting fears.

Television, newspapers, radio, brochures, phone hotlines, and Internet Web sites were all among media used by the communicators to get out their messages regarding the Medfly infestations and control programs. In addition, communicators recruited farmers from affected areas to give talks regarding the possible impacts to their industry and their livelihoods. These speakers were per ceived to be quite effective since they could give first-hand testimonials regarding the need for Medfly eradication.

In at least two counties, the communicators recruited volunteers from various agriculture-related youth organizations and hosted free car washes to residents in area that were being impacted by the malathion bait spray (the protein in the spray could damage auto paint if not washed off in a timely manner). These events were held as ways of generating good will toward the industry and the eradication program in the communities in which they were held. In addition, communicators in at least two of the counties organized "town meetings" at which citizens were invited to dialogue with local and state officials involved with the eradication program.

Communicator Michelle described her organization's efforts by saying,
"The first thing we did was inform community groups, local officials - mayors, councilmen and councilwomen, cou nty commissioners, state legislators - from the affected areas. After that, we held press conferences. We put out media alerts all of the time. We had town meetings. We had public meetings at local high schools, and middle schools in the evenings to explain to the community what it is we found and why we had to treat it, what we were doing, how we were doing it, and when we were going to do it. And then, if you are talking about the Tampa Medfly eradication program, we set up a command post at the Florida State Fair. And every day we had two daily press briefings to tell local radio, TV, and print reporters, what we were doing that day, what area we were going to spray tomorrow, and what times the sprayings would happen."


8) Non-governmental organizations looked to governmental agencies to be the leaders in contact with the public about the Medfly and its eradication. Although private organizations recognize that government agencies made significant contrib utions to communication efforts about the eradication, they also consider the government's communication during the 1997 infestation to be late and inadequate.

Most of the communicators interviewed felt that governmental agencies were, at least in part, responsible for the agriculture industry's slow response to criticisms. Catherine said:
"I think the big communications error in 1997 was that project officials did not realize what the public relations downside of the whole Medfly program could be until late in the game. There were not enough communications officers and regular communication briefings or releases in place. And there were a bunch of guys operating out of the fairgrounds that were operating almost in a vacuum."

Andrew said that from his point of view, the problem was that although the industry looked to the government for leadership, the government agencies were unaware of what communications efforts were necessary. "Part of that problem was that when this first started we [industry communicators] thought, OK, this is a DACS thing, but DACS was not prepared for it either. Initially, they just weren't giving enough information to the public."

Two of the communicators said they felt that the initial lack of communication of important information such as spray schedules lead to a perception that the eradication program was being mismanaged. As a response to such criticisms, one governmental communicator said:
"I've seen that criticism. I personally don't believe it. We had briefings twice a day. We communicated with every radio, TV and newspaper in the Tampa Bay area. We had two daily, live briefings. We had town meetings. I'm not sure that you can do more communicating than that. We did press releases, we did press conferences. We did all kinds of things. People who under any circumstances wouldn't have been happy with what we did, may say, 'Well, you should have communicated more.' I'm not sure five times as much communication would have satisfied the die-hard people who did not want us spraying.

However, all communicators acknowledged that the governmental agencies responsible for the eradication program were helpful in providing experts to speak at public gathering and, later in the course of events, in communicating spray schedules and other important information.


9) Significant improvements were witnessed in the agricultural community's communication efforts during the 1998 infestation when compared to its efforts during the 1997 infestation.

All of the communicators agreed that the communications efforts during the 1998 infestation were much more effective and better organized than those in 1997. "In 1998, it was done the right way - they has sufficient personnel, and they had regular briefings," Catherine said.

The communicators believed that lessons learned by the USDA and DACS during th e 1997 infestation helped improve subsequent efforts. The biggest difference noted in the 1998 communication effort was that the efforts took place before spraying took place. Communities were informed and consulted prior to the application of malathion. Nicole, a communicator for a governmental agency, said:
"We learned that not only do people want to know what's going on in their community, they also want to talk to you about it.... They want to ask you questions. This year, we had public meetings in all of the communities before we did anything."

Another important difference that likely contributed to less public outcry and negative publicity in the mass media is the fact that one of the primary areas affected by the 1998 infestation was a rural community that had a stake in the agricultural health of the area and was more familiar with the use of pesticides.


10) A need is seen for more proactive communication within communities.

Most of the communicators indicated that they see a need for more communication between agriculturists and the communities in which they operate. They stressed the importance of building "good will" in communities and gaining the trust of local citizens and governmental entities. Bruce, a long-time agricultural communicator said:
"If you have not established your reputation as an organization or as an industry that is a contributor to its community^Å as being a valuable asset to the community - when you are in a crisis the community will find no reason to support you. In agriculture, I think it's especially difficult to do that because your farmers and your ranchers are the busiest people you'll ever meet. Mother Nature doesn't take weekends off and neither do farmers, but we need for them to try."


11) The communicators often dismissed the activists as extremists whose arguments were invalid and without merit.

Throughout the interviews, many of the communicators referred to activists, protesters and those against the use of malathion by terms such as "loonies," "crazies," and "tree-huggers." The overall attitude was that the people who were against the application of malathion were misinformed and anti-agriculture. When addressing this issue, Catherine said:
"One of the criticisms I would have for my own industry is that there was a lack of appreciation for the personal convictions that the people who were doing this had. They weren't just people who were misinformed or ignorant or had a hatred for the industry. A lot of them were intelligent, compassionate people who maybe had farming in their history, but they had genuine, sincere, heart-felt concern about their families' health.

"They were lawyers and businessmen. And there were some people who weren't screwed on tight all the way too. But at least half of the group I witnessed were reason able people who believed in their hearts that something was wrong. And we had to reach out to those people as an industry and not just roll them."

Conclusions

Much of the early communication efforts on the part of the government agencies responsible for the eradication efforts were either of the public information or one-way, asymmetrical models. Issuing press releases, giving press briefings, and publicizing spray schedules were clearly not sufficient for communication with the target audience. Clearly the public wanted the opportunity to voice their opinions and give input. However, the methods that were used were effective in getting across "facts" such as the possible impact of Medfly infestations and the economic necessity of eradication. Two-way, symmetrical modes of communication, particularly public meetings and face-to-face interaction were very effective for allaying public fears and should become the communicators' "first line of defense."

A lack of issues management, monitoring and analysis hampered the agricultural community's ability to communicate about Medfly eradication in a timely mann er. Although environmental issues have become prominent in the news media, the communicators were caught unaware when the activists organized and protested the use of malathion in urban areas.

The media's reaction to the Medfly eradication efforts is consistent with the risk communication predictions made by William Adams: the media tended to favor the activists as sources of information, particularly at the height of the controversy; journalists lacked knowledge and facts about malathion and eradication protocols; and there was a tendency for the journalists to personalize this risk-related story. Agricultural communicators who intend to be successful in avoiding communications crises can no longer afford to ignore or minimize environmental concerns. Not only must they closely monitor the activity of activist groups in their localities, but in many cases they must act as advisors to the leadership of their organizations regarding potential public relations pit-falls that may be associated with some courses of action.

A lack of crisis communication plans forced the agricultural communicators to "make it up as they went along." Had they already developed plans, they probably could have communicated faster and with more precision. It is unfortunate that more of the organizations within the agriculture community did not take this opportunity to develop crisis communication plans. In addition, the fact that few of the communicators adequately documented their communications efforts during the infestations is a significant opportunity lost.

Despite contrary opinions from one government communicator, most of the communicators interviewed felt that the governmental agencies in charge of the eradication did not recognize the need for additional communication in a timely manner. The activists were able to establish their position in the media unopposed for a period of several weeks. Incorporation of lessons learned duri ng 1997, as well as a shift in the demographic of the affected communities, led to improved communication efforts during the 1998 infestation. USDA and DACS became proactive in their communication efforts in 1998. In addition, they employed more communication methods that were two-way and symmetrical. It would be beneficial for communicators from all aspects of the agriculture industry to meet and establish specific responsibilities for both public and private entities prior to the next infestation.

The personal relationships and pre-established professional network provided by participation in the Florida Agriculture Institute was a key factor that allowed the communicators to communicate consistent messages as soon as it was determined that outside organizations were needed to supplement the government's communication. Continued participation in this type of professional association is highly recommended for all communicators.

Additional community relations for the agriculture industry is needed. The industry needs to build awareness of their significance to the communities in which it operates. These communications need to be ongoing and should not end when the crisis situation is resolved.

As a final recommendation, the researchers suggest that many of the agricultural communicators take a closer look at the demographics and the psychographics of the activists involved in the protests of malathion. To dismiss them as "loonies" and unreasonable people or to discount their points of view because of a lack of knowledge about agriculture is to make a very dangerous decision that has the potential to further distance agriculture from mainstream society. There is growing evidence that environmentalism is becoming entrenched in everyday life. From recycle bins in the nation's offices to increased demand for organically grown produce, all signs point to a public that is more aware than ever of the factors that impac t the environment. By its very nature, American agriculture must have some negative impacts of the environment if it is to continue to feed the country and the world. But the communicators responsible for the industry's issues management also must acknowledge that it is very likely that mainstream American people will continue to challenge traditional methods of agricultural production.

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