A Paper Presented to the Southern Association of Agricultural Scientists
Agricultural Communications Section
Orlando, FL
February 2002
Susan Grantham
Ph.D. Student
University of Florida
Background
Introduction
During our life span we will spend countless hours perceiving, analyzing and employing behaviors that help us reduce our exposure to risks. While few occurrences can compete with events such as severe weather or human-induced catastrophes, the majority of the time is spent avoiding risks on a day-to-day basis such as washing our hands or looking before we cross a street. We have control over our exposure to some risks such as whether we choose to drink and drive. But we have less control over our exposure to other risks such as air pollution caused by others. Both of these types of risk are salient and demand our attention. However, there is a third category of risk perceived as low-level risks. Low-level risks are not viewed as salient and they do not have our attention. Environmental risks, such as invasive species, are examples of this type of risk.
Invasive species have become established as a result of both intentional and unintentional introductions, such as the introduction of meleleuca in the Everglades, the zebra mussel in the Great Lakes, and cheatgrass in California. Invasive species not only promote undesirable homogeneity of native wildlife and vegetation but are also costly to control or eradicate via chemical, biological, mechanical and ecological control methods. It can be assumed that the general public has a vested interest in this issue. On the other hand, awareness and understanding of the perceived risk associated with the introduction and establishment of invasive species is still fairly low, as compared to other environmental risks such as water pollution.
Low-level risks are frequently classified as social risks. Frequently these social risks come with built-in symbols such as homelessness. However, "Such symbols are not readily available for many ecological problems" (Wilkins and Patterson, 1991, p. 176). The responsibility of dealing with these social risks lay with "someone else."
Because "someone else" is in charge and because we have so little perceived control, these risks merit little attention and in fact, we may not even be aware of many of the specific details that explain or accompany these risks. It must be kept in mind though that these low-level risks can become much more salient if circumstances change. For example if an invasive species overtook an ecosystem upon which we relied to earn a living, the issue would become more salient.
Risk perception research has primarily focused on lay persons "perceptions of technologically induced risk such as nuclear power plants. One evaluates and forms risk perceptions based upon 1) the level at which the individual perceives the risk has the potential to harm or effect the safety of the individual, and 2) the level of risk that are collectively acceptable as" one of the costs associated with the generation of a public benefit (Cole & Withey, 1981, p. 149). Other than participation in developing public policy, the risks evaluated in risk perception literature is outside of the control of the individual. Little research has been done on evaluating ones perception of risk in terms of economic benefits and losses to the individual. In terms of the invasive species issue, the public good is served by becoming knowledgeable about the risk and associated actions individuals can take to prevent the risk such as removing plant material from clothing and equipment and not releasing exotic animals into a non-native environment.
How exactly do we determine if an issue or a situation presents a potential risk? Historically, "Risk perception methods were developed to improve our understanding of public concerns about risky technologies, products and activities. They are multi-dimensional and frequently messy because that is the way human cognition and judgment operate in the real world" (Gregory, 1991, p. 8). Some of our information is developed through first-hand experience or through conversations with others who serve as a credible source. A third avenue is through the mass media. Lacking a representative symbol for environmental problems and issues keeps the media at bay from and thus the public from becoming involved in policy making as it relates to these issues (Wilkins and Patteson, 1991). Stories highlighting risks are the very essence of successful media because they focus on the problem. However, this form of communication can leave the public with little sense of efficacy in relation to the problem other than dread.
Research suggests that information alone is sufficient to raise awareness, but not necessarily enough to cause individuals to perceive a risk as equally important to them. According to Heath, Liao, and Douglas (1995) "... scholars have recognized the importance of receiver-centered, cognitively oriented explanations of how and why people seek and use information" (p. 90). Indeed, the relevant literature has consistently shown that simple exposure to information, such as that which can be achieved through mass media, will not necessarily influence knowledge, attitude or behavior (Rogers, 1995). Risk communication can even create a distorted view of the risk for some individuals which "creates inequalities and unfairness in the decision making process" (Kemp, 1993, p. 115). This is a problem for risk communicators, who disseminate information both to inform the public about the serious nature of a specific risk, as well as provide instructions as to how to combat it. It is therefore important to understand how and why individuals differ in their evaluations and sensitivity to risk, so as to be able to better target information messages designed to achieve actionable outcomes.
Attitude Toward Risk
Grunig's (1983) situational theory suggests an explanation as to how people approach risk issues. Evaluation of a situation includes three independent variables (problem recognition, constraint recognition, and level of cognitive involvement) and two dependent variables (active communication behavior and passive communication behavior). Problem recognition is comprised of determining whether one's own actions, or the actions of others will result in negative outcomes. Constraint recognition is based on the perception as to whether the individual has any control over these actions. The level of cognitive involvement is the degree to which the individual feels a connection to the situation. Active communication behavior occurs when the individual becomes information seeking and is willing to expend sufficient effort to obtain information on the topic. Passive communication behavior results in information processing and determines the individual's willingness to pay attention to a message in its entirety.
Environmental risks such as the increased need for landfills, with high problem recognition (declining natural resources and declining landfill resources), low constraint recognition (individuals can recycle to prevent or reduce some forms of waste disposal) and high cognitive involvement (left unaddressed, the problem will only increase) lead to information seeking actions (what specifically can be recycled and what can be done with the recycled materials). Additionally, research has shown that the higher the perceived risk, the more willing people are to support regulations which reduce the risk.
Conversely, low level risks such as that posed by the invasive species issue have low problem recognition (it is not a problem around here), high constraint recognition (if there is no problem it cannot be dealt with) and low cognitive involvement (if it is not a problem, it requires no attention) leading to information processing actions (message may or may not receive attention). Within this paradigm, there is no recognized need for either individual or regulatory action and intervention.
Previous research has implied "that facts learned change attitudes" (Johnson, 1993, p.196). Dunwoody and Nuewirth (1991) state that "information may have its greatest impacts on such intermediate variables as knowledge and attitudes, which in turn will influence behavior" (p.15). Attitudes can be defined as "evaluative tendencies regarding some feature of the environment and can typically be phrased in terms of like and dislike and favor and disfavor" (Eagly and Chiken, 1993). According to Sjoberg, (2000) "... attitude is a crucial factor in risk perception ..." (p.9). In terms of risk, the professionals who are involved with risk assessment use a technological approach to risk wherein the risk is defined as " . . . the likelihood (or expected frequency) or an (adverse) specified consequence. This level of cognition of the attitude object and salience with the attitude object determines their attitude toward the attitude object. Expert judgments of risk therefore are concerned primarily with risk as probability x consequences" (Kemp, 1993, p. 105).
Lay people, on the other hand, tend to use a subjective approach versus the objective approach employed by risk assessment professionals. Krimsky and Plough (1988) discuss the fact that there are two competing models of risk assessment: one technical for experts and one cultural for the lay public. According to Sandman (1987) "The public tends to dichotomize risk. Either the risk is very frightening, in which case the response is some mix of fear, anger, panic and paralysis; or the risk is dismissed as trivial, in which case the response is apathy" (p. 219). Some risks also have "signal value" because they serve as societal precursors to future similar events (Kemp, 1993). Events such as the Three-Mile-Island accident served as the signal value function to enhance the public's perception of, and sensitivity to, the risk of nuclear power, helping to portray the risk, in many people's minds, as being frightening. Thus their attitude toward nuclear power was one of dislike and disfavor.
Fishoff (1985) stated that "... people tend to overestimate dramatic and sensational events and underestimate the frequency of everyday causes of death. Such misjudgments may be influenced by the memorableness of events and by imagining future ones." Risk perceptions that are "high on the radar screen" of the individual can result in dread and can be a central factor in risk perceptions. However, this may be more true for some individuals than others. "Cognitively involved persons acquire, pause to consider and evaluate information" (Heath, Seshadri and Lee, 1998, p.41).
Humans also employ the "optimistic bias" (OB) framework when assessing risk (Joffe, 1999). The optimistic bias framework provides a reason for the risk assessor to respond in a self-protective manner when determining the level of risk. This unrealistic optimistic approach is also termed risk denial. Risk denial is the sense people have that they are less subject to a risk than others. "A fundamental determinant of OB is the perception that becoming affected by the risk is preventable by individual action" (Joffe, 1999, p. 58).
Reception of Risk Information
Fiske (199 ) describes people who do not like to think as cognitive misers (p. 153). Cognitive misers may lack either the motivation or the skill to process information. Truthfully though, one could not possibly process all the information one is exposed to on a daily basis at the same level. Certain messages are simply more salient and require a higher level of involvement. Initial views can be resistant to change because they influence the manner that subsequent information is interpreted. Information is reviewed as reliable and valid if it is presented in a manner consistent with ones' existing views and knowledge on a topic. Conversely, it is viewed as unreliable or even wrong if the information contradicts ones' existing views and level of knowledge. Due to the fact that some environmental risks lack symbolic representation, such as the invasive species issue, it is possible that messages pertaining to this risk are initially viewed as being inconsistent with the recipients' existing views.
Cacioppo and Petty (1986) developed the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to describe the process people undergo when receiving information. The model shows two main routes of processing; central or peripheral. It is believed that information processed through the central route result in attitudes which are relatively enduring and less subject to change at a future date. Conversely, information processed through peripheral routes may result in temporary attitudes subject to change or revert back to its original position at a later date.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) state that "The likelihood that argument elaboration occurs can be viewed as being a function of separable elements of motivation and ability "(p.79). Weidmann (1993) supports the premise that "Perception presupposes a conceptual framework, i.e. interpretation patterns: it is these that make a viewpoint possible in the first place" (p. 55).
When risk, or the attitude object, is presented as a highly salient issue, then the need for cognition (motivation) increases. Coupled with the ability to process the risk issue, the information is processed through the central route. Conversely, when the attitude object is presented as a low risk, as is frequently done with the invasive species issue, motivation tends to be lowered even if the ability exists. Thus, the information tends to be processed through the peripheral route.
The need for information, and thus elaboration, can be determined by factors such as the perceived need to form one's own opinion or the need to understand the information well enough to participate in the communication process about the issue. Trigger events that bring the issue to the forefront can also play a part in moving the message recipient from the peripheral route to the central processing route.
Information Seeking/Processing
In order to utilize the central processing route, certain pragmatic conditions must be present before the process can be employed (Crunkilton, 1996). The first condition is that a situation, problem or process must be available in order to be thought about. The second condition involves having something to think with such as background, knowledge and information resources. The third condition requires structures with which to guide the process. These can be obtained through previous life experiences or through interpersonal channels. The final condition is the demonstrated salience of the issue. The situation must be perceived as pertinent to ones self in terms of safety or in accordance/conflict with ones morals.
It can be assumed that with respect to risk perceptions the first condition can be met by becoming aware of a specific risk. The second condition can be met by pairing the new information with previous first-hand experience or secondary information sources. The third condition can also be met through utilizing previous experiences as a road map of how to evaluate the situation (or not). The final condition for the need to attend to the issue may be met by the person's attitude toward how immediate the risk is, how potentially harmful and how likely it is that the person assessing the situation might be affected by the risk as well as how symmetrically the solutions jive with ones social conscious.
Message Framing
There are a number of factors to be considered when framing a message. Among these are determining the target audience and hoped for outcome. Within the message there are additional features such as source credibility, intensity (strong or negative), and message sidedness (one-sided or balanced) that help persuade the information recipient to form a specific attitude. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) states that "people evaluate information regarding uncertain (risky) alternatives in terms of either potential gains (positive framing) or potential losses (negative framing) and that preferences can be altered by changing the way information is presented" (p. 257).
"Messages emphasizing losses associated with inaction are generally more persuasive than messages emphasizing gains associated with action" (Davis, 1995, p. 286). Negative messages tend to be seen as more important or consequential. The mass media frequently frames its information in negative constructs because by the very nature of the situation or event having taken a negative direction is what makes it newsworthy. Additionally, messages framed using short-term and long-term context can influence the connotations of the information. Typically, environmental problems are deemed short-term if the impact of the problem will affect the current generation and long-term is the problem will affect future (unknown) generations. The time frame implies to whom the problem will occur and salience would be higher with short-term problems.
Maheswaran and Myers (1990) found that negative frames in their high involvement condition were more persuasive when the central processing route is utilized to evaluate the information. Conversely, when involvement was low, positive frames were more effective. This could be in response to cue effects. The extent to which the message focuses on potential costs of acting in a particular manner presented in negative messages might arouse more attention to the message than positively framed messages that focus on the benefits of behaving in a different manner.
Negatively framed messages which express costs or penalties may trigger a higher level of mental investment in decoding the meaning than positively framed messages that outline the benefits. Positively framed messages that reinforce ones existing views serve to reinforce ones attitude. By not causing any dissonance, the message requires very little cognitive attention.
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that "the extent to which a messages are elaborated can be increased by employing message framing that is unexpected" (Smith and Petty, 1996, p. 267). Therefore, it stands to reason that if messages that involve low-level risks such as invasive species that are typically framed in terms of benefits gained (positive frames) were to be framed in terms of costs (negative frames), the effect would be a greater need to process the information. This violation of expectancies seems to trigger a central processing route to evaluate the information to resolve cognitive dissonance.
Hypotheses
In order to test the effect of message frames on respondents' change in attitudes and level or awareness toward the invasive species risk, the following hypotheses were developed:
H1: There will be a significant change in attitude associated with the invasive species issue for respondents who receive the unexpected or positive message frames.
H2: There will be a significant change in awareness associated with the invasive species issue for respondents who receive the unexpected or positive message frames.
H3: There will be a significant difference in the number of arguments and the quality of arguments for respondents who receive the unexpected or positive message frames.
Method
To conduct this quasi-experimental study a 22-item risk attitude/perception questionnaire derived from the risk perception literature was administered to a random sample of college undergraduates to ascertain the level of risk sensitivity of the respondents to both general and specific risks such as invasive species.
The second part of the survey was comprised of six different message treatment conditions consisting of message frames that discussed the problems associated with water hyacinth, an invasive species that is prevalent in the state of Florida. Each message, approximately 80 words in length, was categorized as either: strong-positive or weak positive (benefits of dealing with issue), strong or weak negative (cost of not dealing with issue), unexpected-positive (benefits of not dealing with the issue), and a control message addressing only the physiology of the plant. With the exception of the control message, all the messages presented the information with short-term ramifications. The various message frames were evaluated for face and content validity through the means of a pilot test administered to a sample of subjects similar to those used in the subsequent study and adjustments were made to ensure reliability and validity before final administration.
The third part of the survey asked the respondents to record thoughts they had while reading the message. Their thoughts were then coded to: (a) determine strength of response to message (argument quality) as being (1) weak, (2) neutral, or (3) strong; and (b) determine the level of elaboration in response to the message by enumerating the thoughts with (0) being no elaboration, (1) being one thought, and so on. This argument elaboration was patterned on standard thought listing techniques established by Petty and Cacioppo (1970).
The final part of the survey included a repetition of the 22-item risk attitude/perception questionnaire. Following exposure, subjects rated their attitudes toward invasive species on a series of five point bipolar scales ranging from 1 = good, like, appealing, beneficial, positive to 5 = bad, dislike, unappealing, harmful, negative. Additional survey items included demographic information about gender, major and race.
Results
Demographics for the subjects under study (n = 86) indicated that 52.9 % were female and 47.1% were male. Additionally, the respondents categorized their fields of study as 44.2% agriculturally related, 18.6% recreation, 8.1% hospitality, 5.8% building, and 22.1% were other which included majors in music, journalism, history, etc.
For hypothesis one, results of repeated measures ANOVA indicated no significant effects for change in attitude for any of the message conditions.
For hypothesis two, results of repeated measures ANOVA indicated no significant effects for change in awareness for any of the message conditions.
For hypothesis three, results of ANOVA indicated no significant effects for either argument elaboration (number of arguments) or argument quality (strength or arguments) for any of the message conditions.
However, a means comparison (see Table 1) indicated that there were a significant result for two of the attitude items (invasive species good/bad - t(82) = 2.168, p<.05, and invasive species positive/negative ^Ö t(84) = 2.54, p<.05).
Table 1. Means comparison for pre- and post- attitude and pre- and post-awareness.
| good/bad | |
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| like/dislike | |
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| appeal/unappealin | |
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| beneficial/harmful | |
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| positive/negative | |
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| Awarness item 2 | |||||
| Very good/bad | |
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Conclusions
The problem with low-level risks is that there is always the potential for them to turn into high-level risks. Low-level risks such as invasive species could certainly benefit from the proverbial ounce of prevention instead of the pound of cure. This is only one of many such low-level risks that receive a limited amount of attention from a limited number of individuals until it becomes a big and costly risk.
Communicating low-level environmental risk information is difficult. There are few symbolic referents for the media to use and the public to understand. Therefore, understanding the risk message factors pertaining to receiving and processing risk messages is critical in developing strategies for communicating information about low-level environmental risks.
This paper has sought to outline the components involved in communicating low-level risks. Risks assessment on the part of the individual tends to be dichotomized as either an extremely salient issue resulting in an attitude of dread that requires intense attention to achieve a comfortable level of cognition, or, alternatively, the risk is perceived as a distant and non-salient issue which requires little to no attention. Highly salient risk issues tend to be centrally processed and low-level risk issues (such as invasive species) tend to be peripherally processed. Therefore, communicating about low-level risks is a difficult task because it lacks the salient characteristics needed for unassisted central processing.
Smith and Petty's previous results suggest that the extent to which messages are elaborated can be increased by employing message frames that are unexpected. Those results were not duplicated in this study and there were no significant effects in which to determine the subjects' level of response based on any of the message frames.
Future research efforts should focus on the effect of repeated positively framed message exposure to this low-level risk. A singular exposure to a message about a low-level risk, even an unexpected message, may not provide the pragmatic conditions (background knowledge, life experience, interpersonal channels) needed to utilize the central processing route. However, repeated positive messages targeted to specific audiences incorporating specific actions the individual can employ to prevent the risk can actually provide the background knowledge and perhaps induce exploration through interpersonal channels. In effect, repeated messages can become the squeaky wheel that needs attention. Through repeated exposure, the risk may be cognitively elevated from a low-level risk to perhaps a persistent, day-to-day, risk that requires our attention.
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